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Expectancy and rational action prior to personal fission 
 




Some analyses of personal fission suggest that an informed subject should expect to 
have a distinct experience of each outcome simultaneously. Is rational provision for the 
future possible in such unfamiliar circumstances? I argue that, with some qualification, 
the subject can reasonably act as if faced with alternative possible outcomes with precise 
probabilities rather than multiple actual outcomes. 
 
 
In recent decades the idea of personal fission has been prominent in discussions of the identity of 
persons over time and imaginary scenarios have been presented in various ways such as divided brain 
hemisphere transplants and malfunctioning Star Trek teleporters. This theoretical work has spawned 
some analyses which suggest that a subject about to knowingly undergo fission should expect to have 
a distinct experience of each outcome simultaneously. If any of these analyses is to be taken seriously, 
or any novel view with the same implication, then it is an interesting question whether a subject in 
such a predicament could make rational future-directed decisions. A surprisingly simple argument 
shows that it is plausible that rational action is possible and would involve taking an attitude towards 
the expected actual outcomes which bears some similarity to normal probabilistic expectancy towards a 
corresponding range of possible outcomes with associated probabilities. 
If any further motivation for tackling this question should be thought necessary it can be found 
in the context of the current lively debate about the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, often 
referred to as the many-worlds interpretation. My own concern with personal fission arises from that 
source and I shall make a couple of footnote references to papers in that literature but there will be no 
need here for any more extensive discussion of what is involved. Readers wishing to find out more on 
the connection with quantum mechanics might start with David Wallace’s recent introduction (2008). 
The fission I shall be discussing might be called classical in the sense that it can be understood in 
terms of what is known as classical mechanics. There are similarities and differences between this and 
the quantum case. 
My aim here is to present an idea, not to review the analyses of personal fission to which it 
might be applied. I shall be articulating the argument in the context of Ted Sider’s ‘stage theory’ 
(1996, 2001) which I shall outline in a moment. I shall use that theory of trans-temporal identity 
because it is transparent and straightforwardly implies that a subject facing fission should expect to 
have each of the output experiences simultaneously as distinct people. Sider’s theory is also suitable 
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because it has become fairly popular, though it is of course not without its critics. Other analyses of 
fission to which the following argument may apply can be found in Gallois (1998), Merricks (1997) 
and Perry (1972).  
According to Sider's stage theory what a person is at any time is a momentary stage in their 
history. Stage theory embraces the idea of temporal parts but rejects conventional reductionism about 
identity which identifies a person’s body with an aggregate of temporal stages, a so-called world-tube 
or spacetime worm. This feat is achieved by exploiting the idea of counterparts which was introduced 
by David Lewis in the context of modal logic (1968 ). Temporal stages in the past or future of a person 
or object are treated by Sider as a type of counterpart, so-called temporal counterparts. Thus I was a 
boy who scrumped apples because I have past temporal counterparts who scrumped apples. My having 
those temporal counterparts makes it true that I was that boy just as, given Lewisian possible worlds, 
my having modal counterparts with blond hair makes it true that I might have been blond. 
According to stage theory it is true that I will be bald if and only if I have future counterparts who 
are bald. If I'm worried about being bald then why, an objector to stage theory might ask, should I 
worry about having a bald future counterpart? After all, that counterpart is not me, he is someone else. 
The stage theorist might respond that I should be worried about my bald future counterparts because 
they are people who I will be. I shall be assuming that some such response is satisfactory but I am not 
here claiming that stage theory is the best analysis of trans-temporal identity. I am using it as a vehicle 
for an argument which might be found applicable to theories other than Sider’s. 
For the sake of conceptual simplicity, imagine a case where a person's body is caused to divide 
smoothly in an amoeba-like way but with each fission product being isomorphic to the original, so 
having the same weight, volume and so on. This could be thought of as a complex process which 
involves the splitting of each constituent molecule into two molecules of just the same type followed 
by the spatial separation of the two sets of molecules. Such a process would require a huge input of 
energy, doubling the total corporeal mass involved, but fission of this type is not obviously physically 
impossible. The subject is anaesthetised and their body is put into a hi-tech splitter. The two 
emergent bodies are then awakened in rooms of different colours, one red and the other green. 
We shall be wanting a hypothetical subject who, for whatever reason, favours the stage-theoretic 
analysis.  The Tuscan sculptor Stagio Stagi had the right name to be a stage theorist if anyone ever 
had so let's call our hypothetical subject Stagio. In matters of trans-temporal identity Stagio embraces 
Sider's stage theory. According to stage theory, if Stagio is about to enter the splitter it is true that he 
will be the person who awakes in the red room and that he will be the person who awakes in the green 
room (Sider 1996. §II; 2001, p.201). That is because Stagio entering the splitter (a temporal stage) has 
a future counterpart in the red room and a future counterpart in the green room and Stagio prior to 
fission has the relation will be to each of those counterparts. The fact that each of those simultaneous 
future counterparts is a distinct person is not at odds with this result. According to stage theory then, 
Stagio prior to fission should expect to awake in the red room and expect to wake in the green room. 
What is Stagio to make of this unusual prospect ? For instance, if a philosophers’ demon forces 
him into the splitter and convincingly tells him that the person in the red room will be held prisoner 
and tortured and the person in the green room will be free to leave how worried should Stagio be, 
believing that these are persons who he will become ? Should he be more worried than if he were not 
facing the splitter but rather were told that he would be taken to the green room and set free ? Should 
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he be less worried than if he were not facing the splitter but rather were told that he would be taken to 
the red room and tortured ? 
A possible reaction here might be to suspend belief because the idea of expecting to have two 
incompatible experiences simultaneously as distinct persons is so strange that we lack the conceptual 
equipment to know what to make of it. But that could seem to be a strategy of despair and there is a 
way forward. To see how, call the person who awakes in the red room StagioR and the person who 
awakes in the green room StagioG. These are people who were both previously Stagio. And imagine 
that when StagioR and StagioG are awakened the lights are out in their rooms so that they are in 
complete darkness and Stagio knows in advance that this will be so. It would seem that under these 
circumstances Stagio should expect to experience waking in complete darkness since that is the 
common experience of StagioR and StagioG. 
Now, StagioR in the dark can very plausibly assign probabilities as to whether he is in the red 
room or the green room2. Given the symmetry of the setup it seems reasonable that he should assign 
equal probabilities to each possibility and so a probability of a half to each. StagioG should do 
likewise. So StagioR and StagioG should each think he has an evens chance of finding himself in the 
red room when the lights are switched on. 
In which case each should be worried to the extent they would be if the demon were to toss a 
fair coin to decide between torture and freedom. So, if Stagio knows in advance that the lights will be 
out for a while before the fates of StagioR and StagioG are decided it looks as though he should be 
confident that he will experience being just as worried about torture as if he were facing a decision 
based on the tossing of a fair coin rather than the fission setup. It appears that Stagio prior to fission 
has good reason to feel about his prospects in just the way he would feel if he were not facing fission 
but knew that the demon would decide his fate on an upcoming coin toss.  
Note that the implication is not that Stagio, prior to fission, should assign a credence of one 
half to waking in the red room. We have already seen that according to stage theory he should fully 
believe that he will wake in the red room and that he will wake in the green room. Rather, the idea is 
that Stagio prior to fission, knowing that he will find himself temporarily in the dark, has good reason 
to view his prospects as if he were facing torture or freedom on the toss of a coin. 
Some qualification is called for here. StagioR being tortured knows that StagioG is enjoying 
freedom and that might temper StagioR’s suffering. Similarly, StagioG set free knows that StagioR is 
being tortured and so StagioG’s relief could be spoiled by that thought. This is different from the coin 
toss situation. If torture or freedom is decided on a coin toss only one or the other of the options is 
actualised, no both, so the tortured person does not have any reason to think about a free one and vice 
versa. However, it is not obvious that this is enough to completely undermine Stagio’s ability to 
adopt a rational attitude towards his fission when he knows that the lights will be out for a while. To 
see why we can consider how Stagio might be motivated to lay stakes if the red and green rooms were 
associated with a payoff regime like the outcomes of coin tosses on which bets are placed. 
Before going into this we need to reflect on what becomes of Stagio’s money when he enters the 
splitter. Being well informed, StagioR knows that there exists a StagioG who has an equal claim on 
his bank account and  vice versa. So Stagio should expect in advance to face financial uncertainty since 
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that is common to the experience of StagioR and StagioG. In order that fission should not in itself 
have financial consequences for Stagio it would be necessary to provide independent bank accounts for 
StagioR and StagioG each containing the same funds as were available to Stagio prior to fission. 
Assume that Stagio has that assurance. 
We saw that StagioR and StagioG with the lights out each has good reason to think that he has 
an evens chance of being in the green room. Suppose that they were betting men and each were told 
that for any stake laid there would be a payoff of more than two-to-one to the person in the green room 
and nothing to the person in the red room. If confident in the honesty of the setup both StagioR and 
StagioG should accept this as a good bet though the above qualification also applies since when 
StagioR loses he will know that StagioG has won and vice versa and that thought may affect how they 
judge what are sufficient odds to make the bet worthwhile. In the case of betting on the toss of a coin 
any odds over two-to-one can seem worth taking but in the fission case it is not clear that that is so. 
However, it is implausible that mutual empathy between StagioR and StagioG should completely 
overrule any parallel between the fission and coin toss scenarios. For suppose that the payoff in the 
green room is a billion-to-one with the stake simply being lost in the red room. It is hard to imagine 
that StagioG’s glee at having won a fortune for a relatively trivial stake would be tempered very much 
by the thought that StagioR had lost a few pennies, or even by the thought that StagioR may feel very 
miffed at not having won the jackpot. Bear in mind that StagioR and StagioG are distinct persons who 
could just as well be on different planets. It’s true that they share a common history but that has been 
and gone by payoff time. In general, gamblers who win a bet are not too bothered about the people 
who lose. 
What this seems to show is that the qualification to do with mutual empathy in the fission case 
makes it differ from the chance analogue on a sliding scale. In the betting case the empathy factor may 
affect the marginal payoff regime which is acceptable but it may have less and less affect on a punter’s 
behaviour the better the offered payoff regime is. I shall return to a more extreme case akin to torture 
and freedom in a moment but first of all more needs to be said about betting. 
So far we have seen that StagioR and StagioG both have reason to lay a stake if the lights are out 
and the payoff regime is good enough. But does this have any bearing on how Stagio should act prior 
to fission? Well, suppose Stagio is told what the payoff regime will be and that there will only be a 
payoff in the green room if a stake is laid prior to fission and suppose that that payoff regime is good 
enough to motivate StagioR and StagioG to take the bet when the lights are out. In that case both 
StagioR and StagioG would regret that a stake had not been laid if Stagio had not done so. So Stagio 
can be confident that after fission and prior to the lights going on he will feel regret unless he has laid 
the stake that he knows StagioR and StagioG would judge appropriate, which seems to be a very good 
reason for Stagio to lay that stake in advance. 
But what if there were no period of blackout after fission ? Imagine that Stagio is told that for 
there to be any payoff a stake must be laid before fission and the payoff regime will be such that if there 
were temporary blackout then StagioR and StagioG would want a stake to have been laid. But now 
Stagio knows that there will not be a period of blackout. Straight after fission StagioR will lose and 
StagioG will win. In that case Stagio knows that StagioG will be glad to have won and StagioR will 
be sad to have lost.   Lloyd Humberstone (1980) has pointed out that in ordinary betting situations a 
punter has good reason to expect that regret is inevitable. Unless it were impossible to have staked 
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more, StagioG will regret not having laid a larger stake. And StagioR will regret having laid a stake at 
all. 
If regret is inevitable then it seems reasonable that Stagio should aim to minimise the regret 
which he knows he will come to feel. Note that StagioG, having won, feels more regret the lower the 
stake and StagioR feels more regret the higher the stake so it looks as though there is scope for 
compromise. A reasonable compromise is for Stagio to lay exactly the stake which he knows StagioR 
and StagioG would judge appropriate if they were in the dark. Arguably a punter in a normal betting 
situation reasons in a similar way. The stake s/he judges appropriate to lay weighs the regret s/he 
would feel at not having staked more if winning against the regret s/he would feel at not having staked 
less if losing. That being so, it looks as though Stagio is motivated to lay a stake in advance if the 
payoff regime is good enough even if there is no prospect of being in the dark after fission. The very 
possibility of being in the dark after fission is enough to guide Stagio’s reasoning beforehand. 
In order to be clear about what I’m claiming here it may be useful to consider a hybrid case 
involving both chance and fission. Suppose that Stagio is told that a fair die will be rolled to 
determine whether he undergoes fission or not. If the die comes up 6 he will not undergo fission and 
otherwise he will go into the splitter as before. In this case Stagio, prior to the roll of the die, judges 
that the probability of becoming StagioR is 5/6 and the probability of becoming StagioG is 5/6. The 
fact that these probabilities sum to 5/3 does not reveal an inconsistency but just the strangeness of 
stage theory as applied to fission. Recall that when fission is certain Stagio prior to fission judges that 
the probability of becoming StagioR is 1 and the probability of becoming StagioG is 1. 
If fission takes place after the roll of the die but StagioR and StagioG are in the dark and do not 
know whether or not fission has indeed occurred then each will judge the probability that fission has 
occurred as 5/6 and so, given the symmetry of the setup, that the probability of being in the red room 
is 5/12. That is the probability that StagioR and StagioG will take into account if offered a bet and so 
what Stagio needs to take into account if the argument which I have presented is good. But note again 
that the implication is not that Stagio prior to the die roll should expect, with a credence of 5/12, to 
awake in the red room. At best the argument shows that Stagio should lay a stake as if the chance of 
awaking in the red room were 5/12. To repeat, according to stage theory, prior to the roll of the die, 
Stagio should expect with a credence of 5/6 to awake in the red room and should expect with a 
credence of 5/6 to awake in the green room. Note also that he should assign a credence of zero to 
waking in the red room and the green room according to stage theory since no one person awakes in 
the two rooms simultaneously.  
This last point deserves a little more discussion as it is prima facie very strange. The problem 
is that it can be tempting, putting oneself in Stagio’s place, to try to imagine what it would be like to 
expect to awake in a red room and in a green room simultaneously and to mentally grope for an 
intuition which could help guide one’s judgement about how best to act. That’s rather like a novice 
aircraft pilot who is tempted to think that it is possible to fly in cloud without instruments. But it is 
just not possible; without a gyroscopically driven artificial horizon the pilot is bound to lose control 
because the sensibilities developed on terra firma play tricks. The more firmer the less terror, as pilots 
say. What I’m claiming is that, for Stagio, imagining the judgements StagioR and StagioG would 
make if they were in the dark acts as a sort of mental artificial horizon which can steer decision-making 
though fission. 
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Sider’s theory suggests that a person should assign a credence of X to having a given future 
experience if and only if the probability of having a temporal counterpart having that experience is X. 
That implies that Stagio, facing fission with probability X, should assign a credence of X to awaking 
in the red room and a credence of X to awaking in the green room. But on Sider’s theory ‘I will awake 
in the red room and I will awake in the green room’ is not logically equivalent to ‘I will awake in the 
red room and the green room’ on our usual understanding because the latter phrase is normally taken 
to imply that one person will be in both rooms. According to stage theory the persons in the two 
rooms are distinct albeit having a common origin. The credences which Stagio, prior to fission, must 
assign to future experience simply do not add up to being credences which he can use to guide his 
future-directed action. They are logically coherent within the framework of stage theory but for all 
practical purposes they are useless, rather like a pilot’s sense of orientation in cloud. Stagio needs to 
keep his mind’s eye on the artificial horizon, the credence assignments StagioR and StagioG would 
make if subject to the appropriate ignorance conditions. It is those credence assignments which can 
help to guide Stagio’s decision-making prior to fission if the arguments which I have presented are 
correct. 
We have been imagining fission as a symmetric bifurcation of Stagio's body but splitting into 
three, four or even a denumerable infinity of output bodies ought to be allowable if bifurcation is. If 
there were a number N of distinct outcomes then output persons held in a state of ignorance about their 
outcome should very plausibly assign a probability of 1/N to that outcome being a particular one of the 
range. Further, if there were N outcomes where a proportion A/N were outcomes of type A, a 
proportion B/N were outcomes of type B and so on then the post-fission, pre-observation subject 
should assign a probability of A/N to seeing an outcome of type A and B/N to seeing an outcome of 
type B etc.. 
This thought can be used to demonstrate another way in which Stagio’s reasoning facing fission 
cannot be exactly as it would be in facing corresponding chancy scenarios despite the similarities 
which I have discussed so far. Imagine that Stagio had lost a leg to a shark and a special new fission 
treatment were available which had an unavoidable defect3. The treatment involves a thousandfold 
fission where 999 output persons have two good legs but one is rendered legless. If Stagio were facing 
a treatment which involved a one-in-a-thousand chance of leglessness he might well take the risk. In 
the fission case, if the patients were held in a temporary state of ignorance they would each suppose 
that the chance of being legless was one-in-a-thousand but Stagio would know in advance that there 
must be a legless person. Could he go ahead with the treatment in the fission case in the same way 
that he might in the corresponding chancy case ? It’s not clear he could. Moral issues arise which are 
absent in the chancy case. In opting for the fission treatment Stagio can be sure that someone will find 
himself legless, though perhaps that thought is mitigated to some extent by the fact that Stagio would 
believe in advance that if he went ahead with the treatment the legless person would be aware that he 
himself was the person who signed the consent form. 
That thought experiment was based on the idea of fission into many outcomes. The idea of 
multiple splitting introduces a further complication. Imagine that Stagio is faced with a three-way split 
with StagioR and StagioG arriving in red and green rooms as before but also with a StagioB in a blue 
room. If the lights were out StagioR, StagioG and StagioB would each put the odds at one third of 
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finding himself in the red room. But now suppose that Stagio were told that rather than a straight 
three-way split there would be a double two-way split, all taking place on anaesthetised subjects. First 
of all Stagio would fission into StagioR, who would be wheeled straight into the red room, and 
StagioX who would then go on to fission into StagioG and StagioB. In that case, whilst the lights 
were out, it would seem compelling that StagioR, StagioG and StagioB should put the odds at one 
half of being in the red room, one quarter of being in the green room and one quarter of being in the 
blue room. So if Stagio is faced with a scenario where he needs to factor in the possible credence 
assignments of post-fission, pre-observation persons who he will become he needs to know exactly 
what the form of the fission setup is in order to be able to do that. 
Finally, there is another class of possible fission scenarios which needs to be taken into account. 
Suppose that Stagio is told that in the red room, rather than being awakened, he will be instantly and 
painlessly killed. In that case the post-fission subject in the unlit room can be certain that when the 
light is switched on he will see green. And Stagio pre-fission can be sure that he will survive the 
process and see green. That is not at all like the equivalent chance setup where a person is faced with a 
fifty-fifty chance of dying. What this points up is the fact that the post-fission subject who knows 
fission has occurred but remains ignorant of the outcome knows that he is not dead so his judgement of 
the probabilities of seeing various outcomes must be ‘renormalised’ to take this into account. That is, 
in a case of one-stage fission into N outcome branches where some number D of them involve instant 
death of the subject then the full range of branches for which the post-fission subjects in a state of 
ignorance about outcomes must use as a basis for calculating proportions is not N but rather N minus 
D.  
The upshot of all this seems to be that Stagio’s predicament facing fission is not clear-cut but he 
need not necessarily be excluded from making rational provision for the future either. It looks as 
though there is a body of cases where Stagio might reasonably act much as if he were facing a range of 
possible outcomes with associated probabilities rather than a range of actual outcomes but the idea 
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